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ABSTRACT
Articulation as an Act of Futility:
A Post-Structuralist Exploration of Textual Articulation as it
Functions within a First-Person Narrative Structure
by
Wilson W. Onstott
The inability of language to convey complete meaning and truth is a central
point of address for much post-structuralist literary theory and criticism. When
these theories are applied to a first-person narrative structure, whether it is a
work of fiction or non-fiction, certain specific incongruities arise. When a
narrative voice seeks to recall certain events, a presupposed reexamination
takes place as the narrative unfolds text comes into being. If a narrative is
contructed in this way then the intent of the text then is to convey
comprehensive meanings or truths of those cataloged experiences. According
Deconstructive Theory, it is language’s inherent nature to resist ultimate
meaning. This focus on the articulation of truth is futile because meaning, like
language, is always already in a state of fragmentation. This project explores
five individual works from different literary traditions—ranging from the
canonical to the relatively obscure. The works exhibit various approaches to
articulation; including varying degrees of self-definition, personal fiction, and
narrative movement toward inarticulation.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

“It is impossible to say just what I mean!”
—T.S. Eliot
These words appear near the close of Eliot’s The Love Song of J. Alfred
Prufrock and are an exclamation of the angst that overcomes the speaker
when he realizes that he is unable to fully distinguish his meaning. Try as he
may, he can never bring his meaning to actuality and must finally retreat to
“the floors of silent seas” (14). In this poem, Eliot touches on a problem that is
fundamental to all forms of writing: articulation. With regard to the production
of language and subsequently the production of a text, the act of meaning
what one says is not nearly as cumbersome and problematic as saying what
one means. Inevitably, there will always be something that is left unsaid or
unwritten, and consequently there will always be the capacity for fluctuation of
interpretation in any text. The inability of language to achieve a complete
meaning and subsequently a complete truth is a central point of address for
much post-structuralist literary theory and criticism. When these theories are
applied to a first-person narrative structure, whether it is a work of fiction or
non-fiction, certain specific incongruities always arise. When the narrative or
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narrator seeks to recall certain events, a presupposed reexamination is figured
as the text comes into being. The fundamental objective of the text then is to
convey the actuality of situation—a complete and comprehensive truth.
According to the Deconstructive Theory of Jacques Derrida and Paul de Man,
it is language’s inherent nature to resist any one essential meaning. Therefore,
the focus on the articulation of truth is futile because “meaning,” like language,
is always-already in a state of “fragmentation.” Yet, according to the largely
language-based postmodern philosophical explorations of Ludwig Wittgenstein
and later Martin Heidegger, language is the entity that defines an individual’s
conception of reality. Hence, the drive toward a complete articulation of
meaning, although ultimately futile, is inherent to all speaking and thinking
bodies—all want to conjointly self-define and be understood. Thus, the
paradox: in order to comprehend reality to its greatest extent (presupposing
that such a level of awareness is within the domain of cognitive possibility), we
must first push language to its greatest extent; but language is an imperfect
structure and intense exploration of its limits will cause it to deconstruct,
ultimately, to the point of meaninglessness; therefore, complete knowledge of
reality—the ability of language fully extended—is fundamentally illogical and
continuously locked in inarticulation, where the actuality of all lingual and
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textual systems exist in a state of schizophrenic flux, or if characterized by its
effect on the individual conciousness: madness.
Presented in five sections, this project explores five individual works from
different genres and literary traditions—ranging from the canonical to the
relatively obscure. These works include Mark Twain’s Adventures of
Huckleberry Finn, Tim O’Brien’s partially autobiographical Vietnam narrative
The Things They Carried, Junichiro Tanizaki’s epistolary novel The Key,
Marguerite Duras’s experimental anti-novel L’Amante Anglaise (which loosely
translates to “The English Lover”), and Edgar Allen Poe’s well-known short
story “The Cask of Amontillado.” Textual articulation is a fundamental issue in
all of these works, but the different ways in which this problem is addressed
and dealt with is the main point of interest for this investigation.
The investigation moves through five related modes of theoretical
analysis that each has a specific scope of interest and focus of exploration. The
first, a theoretical reading of Huckleberry Finn, explores the main character’s
pursuit of self-definition through the creation of language. In addition, the first
section discusses the historical characterization of the work as “The Great
American Novel” and how Huck’s process of self-definition through language
creation is a metaphor for Mark Twain’s definition of “America” via the
creation of a quintessentially “American” language within the text. The second
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section deals with Tim O’Brien’s unique conception of truth in relation to
autobiographical writing in The Things They Carried. In the work, O’Brien
openly admits that many sections of the text are fictional but claims that the
truth of his war experiences cannot be articulated through realistic and
definitive accounts. Rather, he holds that by fictionalizing certain aspects of his
stories, he is able to communicate more comprehensive truths and more
complete meaning. The third section focuses on the production of a personal
fiction through the act of writing itself, in Junichiro Tanizaki’s The Key. This
section explores how the novel, written in the form of two individually seperate
journals, exposes how the act of writing vainly seeks to capture the initial
vivacity of experience through the documenting of memory. The result of this
pursuit is the creation of a personal fiction where new memories do not spawn
from experience but rather are a creation of the text. The confusion of
existence and essence that appears in The Key, as manufactured memories are
confused with a textual essence of meaning, is explored more thoroughly in the
fourth section, which focuses on the breakdown of articulation in Marguerite
Duras’s L’Amante Anglaise. The novel, written in the form of three transcribed
interrogations, seeks to make a connection between the existence—the physical
act of murder—and the essence, or motive, for the act. Claire Lannes, a
confessed murder, is unable to articulate her motivations for the murder and
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mutilation of her cousin. Unable to extract this information, the interrogator
resolves that the woman is insane because she is unable to articulate her
motive and therefore the murder was an act of madness. The final section, a
largely Bakhtinian reading of Poe’s “The Cask of Amontillado,” explores the
causes for the narrator’s inability to articulate the cause of his violent actions.
In Poe’s tale, the atmosphere of the medieval carnival alters the murderous
narrator’s perception of reality to a point where can he neither feel
responsibility nor guilt for his actions. Accordingly, he is able to make
reference to his feelings previous to the act, but unable to make a fluid causal
connection between his actions inside and outside the collective body of the
carnivalesque. For these reasons, the narrator is often understood by readers
and critics to be insane; but this is hardley the case. Rather, his acts resist
articulation because he undergoes a carnivalesque perceptive shift that does
not permit articulation outside of itself. Because the story is told in the past
tense, he does not have access to the implications of that altered perception,
and therefore, cannot articulate the reasons for his actions.
The sections explore the movement of lingual and textual articulation
from the empowering act of self-definition to the bewildering and sometimes
terrifying aspect of lingual and textual meaninglessness. Through close
reading and application of various Deconstructive veins of thought, each work
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displays different levels of textual deconstruction that exist in all narrative
structures. Yet often times the works that we find to be the most intriguing and
astute have many structural aspecst that are similar to those works that we find
to be the most inarticulate and inaccessible. The difference is often the level of
articulation that the given work is willing to derive, and the difference between
a work of genius and a work of madness is many times infinitesimal.
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CHAPTER 2
DEFININGING THE GREAT AMERICAN NOVEL: LITERAL AND
METAPHORICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE DESIRE FOR SELFIDENTIFICATION IN HUCKLEBERRY FINN

Perhaps the best place to begin a discussion of the structure of language
and its relation to the production of text is with a novel that is overtly
preoccupied with this relationship. Mark Twain’s Adventures of Huckleberry
Finn has achieved an esteemed position in the American literary canon. The
social and critical weight of the novel led to it famously being dubbed “The
Great American Novel,” in the January 1869 issue of The Nation, in an essay
by John William DeForest which consequently bears the same name. Ernest
Hemingway adamantly reinforces DeForest’s sentiment in The Green Hills of
Africa. In this work Hemmingway states, "All modern American literature
comes from one book by Mark Twain called Huckleberry Finn…There was
nothing before. There has been nothing as good since" (22). Similar
expressions of veneration have been expressed by many important literary
figures; some of the most notable among them include William Faulkner, T.S.
Eliot, and Toni Morrison. But in the ranks of such literary heavyweights as these
(all, including Hemingway, were Nobel Prize Winners), Twain is often singled
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out as a true “raging bull”—a formidable and complete master of the craft.
And if this is the case, then Huck Finn is surely his golden glove.
But what sets Huck Finn apart from other “great” works of American
fiction? The story itself is a fairly true-to-form bildungsroman novel that
chronicles the worldly education and personal growth of the young
Huckleberry Finn. Yes, the novel casts a critical eye on issues of racism in
America and the moral deficiencies of organized religion, but Twain was
certainly not the first American writer to openly address these controversial
topics. Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin, which was published more
that thirty years before Huckleberry Finn, addresses many of the same issues—
why is this work not critically and publicly heralded as “The Great American
Novel”? Conversely, the image of Huck and Jim’s raft floating down the
Mississippi River may very well invoke a unique visceral understanding of
freedom and escape that is perfectly and quintessentially “American.” If this is
the case, then why have works such as Henry David Thoreau’s Walden or even
Jack Kerouac’s On The Road not received the widespread acclaim and
emphatic critical praise of Huck Finn? Do these works not also conjure a
distinctly, if not definitively, “American” brand of freedom? What then sets
Huckleberry Finn apart from these other great works of “American” literature
and elevates it to the status of “The Great American Novel”?
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The answer is complexly simple: where the aforementioned literary
works fall short (and I do not mean to downplay their literary or social
importance for they are all extraordinary artistic achievements in their own
right) is that at their very best they only describe that which is “American” by
exploring various preexisting aspects of American life and thought. The fallacy
that these works commit is that the term “American” is assumed to be a selfdefining concept. It is not. A literary investigation and/or exploration of the
attributes of that which is “American,” however eloquent and artfully crafted,
only serves to make the concept that much more elusive and amorphous. The
characteristic that sets Twain apart, and earns Huckleberry Finn its label of
distinction, is that Twain does not want to describe what is “American” but
rather he sets out to define “America,” and Huckleberry Finn is his definition.
Consequently, the novel is a deconstruction America as an idea, in the form of
a metaphorical search-narrative that aims to uncover deeper truth and meaning
with respect to that idea.
Huck Finn is a novel that is preoccupied with language, and with good
reason. In order to render a definition, Twain must first establish a vocabulary
that is capable of the task. His approach to this linguistic dilemma is primarily
achieved through interlingual innovation. Not only does he explore a variety
of conventional veins of articulation by carefully crafting an individualized and
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succinct system of phraseology that is often purposely laden with underlying
meaning and generally character-specific, but he also reproduces regional
dialects and vernacular forms of speech within the text. By incorporating
vernacular speech into the text, Twain is able to further the underlying
implications of each character’s specific lexicon. Twain even specifically
comments on his incorporation of dialect in the final section of Huck Finn’s
introduction entitled EXPLANATORY. This short passage reads:
In this book a number of dialects are used, to wit […] The
shadings have not been done in a haphazard fashion, or by
guess-work; but pains-takingly, and with the trustworthy guidance
an support of personal familiarity with these several forms of
speech. I would make this explanation for the reason that without
it many readers would suppose that all these characters were
trying to talk alike and not succeeding. (xxxiii)
This introductory note, when coupled with a detailed examination of the text,
exposes how the different ways that the characters speak is far too systematic
and formulaic to be accidental (Carkeet 316). The purpose of this stylistic
explanation is just the opposite of Twain’s implicitly stated intention to shift the
reader’s focus away from the vernacular discrepancies of his characters’
speech but rather to alert the existence of these inconsistencies to his readers
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directly. Although Twain implies in the EXPLANATORY that dialect is an
important aspect of the novel, he never elaborates on the exact nature of that
importance. The meticulous attention to lexical and linguistic detail in Huck
Finn is evidence of Twain’s desire to articulate certain meanings and truths that
conventional forms of language tend to obscure.
It is no surprise that inside the scope of the novel, Twain's preoccupation
with language is characterized most strongly by its narrator and namesake.
The novel’s fundamental driving force is Huck’s ardent pursuit of self-definition.
Yet, like Twain, in order to ascribe a definition Huck must first create a capable
vocabulary. Essentially, Huck’s personal growth over the course of the novel
results from his ever-increasing ability to create a language with which to
define himself. Self-definition is primarily brought about by Huck’s everdeveloping comprehension of his own differences from other characters in the
novel. Through the recognition of moral flaws in certain key characters—
imperfections that fundamentally proceed from some form of linguistic inability,
confusion, or inarticulation—Huck is able to reconcile ambiguous aspects of his
own morality.
The forms of language and dialect used by other characters in the novel,
most significantly those of the Widow Douglas and Miss Watson, Pap Finn,
Tom Sawyer, and the slave Jim, expose the specific limitations of each
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character’s perception of reality. Perhaps the language that is most
prominently imposed on Huck throughout the novel is that of the Widow
Douglas and Miss Watson. Their language not only has the strongest moral
agenda, but it also carries with it the most direct deterrent to opposition. That
ever-present threat of punishment, of course, is going to Hell, or as Huck often
says, “the bad place” (3). Douglas and Watson’s language is the formalized
discourse of organized religion, and it is subsequently characterized as the
language of education. The perception of reality fostered by this form strongly
discourages questioning the validity of its own articulation. Huck’s opposition to
his caretakers’ prescribed religious vernacular is often signaled by his
recitation of their language as a subtle form of mockery. He says that he does
not desire to be “cramped up and sivilized, as they called it” (31). Huck’s use
of the word “sivilized” (civilized) functionally subverts the authority of their
language through redefinition. Yet this subversion culminates with a complete
rejection in Chapter 31 when Huck resolves to help free Jim. Huck is struck
with an overwhelming moral dilemma because be believes that this actions
sharply conflict with the tenets of the predefined moral structure. The final
decision to help free Jim, despite the perceived extreme immorality of the
action, signals an opposition by redefinition where “good” and “bad” find
new meanings. Huck’s famously voices this decision by saying, “Alright then,
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I’ll go to hell,” effectively marking a complete divergence of his conception of
morality from that held by Miss Watson and the Widow Douglas.
Another form of language that seeks to impose its will on Huck is the
language of his father, Pap Finn. Pap is arguably bound by the limits of his
language more than any other character in the novel. The unbridled rage that
often consumes him stems from his limited perception of reality, which is
brought on by his limited grasp of language. He is able comprehend the
characteristics of his anger and rage through the concrete acts of violence that
they produce, but he lacks the necessary language to define the essence of his
anger. The irony of Pap’s situation is that if he had the ability to articulate the
cause of his anger, he would no longer have reason to be angry. Pap
exemplifies an idea that is central to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus—the proposition that “The limits of my language mean the limits
of my world” (68: 5.6). Thus, Pap’s disapproval of Huck’s formal education
by the Widow Douglas is driven by internalized envy and subconscious
feelings of inadequacy. Pap also makes frequent references to the language of
others in an often harsh or critical way that is designed to disguise his jealousy.
Perhaps the most interesting example of this is the fairly infamous “call this a
government” speech where he drunkenly babbles on about voting rights that
were granted to a Black college professor in the North. He makes a specific

16

connection between language and knowledge during the speech when he
remarks that the professor “could talk all kinds of languages, and knowed
everything” (34). Here, Pap makes a corresponding connection between
language and knowledge that is very explicit. His argument is not
fundamentally the product of racial bigotry; rather his disgust arises out of his
own insecurity and ignorance. The fact that man in question is Black only
serves to illustrate the power that language holds. The Black college professor,
undoubtedly a former slave, is able to elevate his marginalized social status
through the acquisition of language and education. The angst-ridden language
of Pap has a great effect on Huck and is arguably the cause of his predisposed
tendency to reject the language of Miss Watson and the Widow Douglas. Yet
Huck is able to observe the devastating results of inadequate language through
the abuse he endures at the hands of an enraged Pap. There is little doubt that
Huck’s view of Pap, as a pathetic and broken man, is the fundamental
motivation for his rejection of Pap’s language and also the resulting
fragmented and incomplete conception of reality that his language produces.
Another form of language that exists in the novel is one that is consumed
with notions of romantic fantasy. This form is manifested in the character of
Tom Sawyer. His form of language creates, in many ways, a false and
somewhat delusional sense of reality. He is consumed by romantic ideas of
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wild adventures that are hardly every complete without some element of pulp
fiction or dime novel sensationalism, such as gangs, robbers, or pirates.
Through his use of language, Tom is able to create highly realistic web of
fictional fantasy. The high sense of adventure that this form creates is the main
reason for its attractiveness to Huck. The language of Tom provides the
possibility to escape the confines of civilized society. Initially Huck is a fan of
Tom’s language and the altered state of romantic reality that it creates. Huck
makes reference to this when he is considering boarding an abandoned
steamboat wreckage. During this scene Huck says to Jim:
Do you reckon Tom Sawyer would ever go by this thing? Not for
pie he wouldn’t. He’d call it an adventure—that’s what he’d call
it; and he’d land on that wreck as if it was his last act. And
wouldn’t he throw style into it? (81)
Although Huck is initially entranced by this false reality, by the end of the novel
is it obvious that Huck no longer sees Tom’s language as fanciful and romantic,
but rather a web of lies. This is evident to reader when the elaborate plot to
free Jim is exposed as a ploy orchestrated by Tom Sawyer—selfishly
manufactured for his own entertainment. His prior knowledge of Jim’s freedom
was obscured in order to live out a fantasy. This is the main problem with
Tom’s form of language, it not only obscures the truth but it also inhibits his
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ability to make decisions from a moral standpoint. In a sense, his language is
just as dogmatic as that of Miss Watson and The Widow Douglas; but rather
than being governed by the religious conventions, Tom is governed by the
rules and images of fictional romance and fanciful notions of adventure.
Finally, the greatest influence on Huck’s language and his conception of
reality is the slave Jim. Like Huck, Jim is confined by an oppressive society.
His language was not born out of an affluent atmosphere, but rather one of
racial oppression and bigotry, of which he is the traget. Jim’s grasp of
language supplies him with a limited understanding of the world, but this allows
him to make eloquently poetic observations about the world. However, the
weight and breadth of these observations is often lost on Jim himself, and as a
result, he is largely ignorant of his own deft insight. This phenomenon can be
observed in the conversation that he has with Huck concerning King Solomon.
Jim says:
En Mine you, de real pint is down furder—it’s down deeper. It
lays in de way Sollermun was raised. You take a man dat’s got
on’y one er two chillen? Is dat gwyne be to wasefu o’ chillen?
No, he ain’t […] But you take a man dat’s got ‘bout five million
chillen runnin’ roun’ de house, en it’s diffunt. He as soon chop a
chile in two as a cat. Dey’s plenty mo’. (96)
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This interpretation is a legitimate charge against Huck’s “conventional”
interpretation. Yet only Huck is able to gain from Jim’s insight. Jim’s
somewhat primitive grasp of language allows him to ask fundamental questions
and make fundamental observations, but it does not allow him to translate
these musings into a larger holistic understanding of the world. The major
point of division between the Jim and Huck is that Jim is gullible, via
superstition and folk beliefs, and Huck is naïve because he lacks in world
experience. Thus, Jim’s language provides Huck a worldly perspective and
serves as the primary catalyst for his own self-definition. Jim’s language is
purely fundamental—it represents a basic level of understanding—and this is
represented in his phonetic pronunciations and fragmented form of dialect.
However, the purity of Jim’s language is also its primary flaw. It can only hint
at truth and meaning, yet it is incapable of articulating higher-level
relationships between meaning and truth and therefore is stagnant. Hence,
Huck is able to learn a great deal about the world from Jim and his language,
but he must also break away from it in order to fully articulate unique thoughts
and ideas.
At the novel’s conclusion, Huck is able to establish self-definition by
moving away from the symbolic forms of language that seek to confine him.
This metamorphosis is symbolized by the death of both Pap and Mrs. Watson,
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the exposing of Tom’s lies, and the freedom of Jim. Also, at the end of the
novel Huck relates that he would like to go West in order to avoid Aunt Sally’s
desire to “sivilize” him. It is entirely possible that Twain is using the idea of the
untamed American West to symbolize a freedom of body and thought that is
nearly impossible in the conservative civilized South. Thus, Huck’s desire to go
West is symbolic of his desire to further his process of self-definition on his own
terms—to further the creation of his own vocabulary of understanding.
Thus, the Adventures of Huckleberry Finn is able to define “America”
through the character of Huck by creating a new vocabulary. Twain rejects
those language forms that foster oppression and bigotry. In essence, the
language that Twain produces is the language of the individual—one that is
able to voice internalized understandings of morality and truth. For these
reasons, the characterization of Huckleberry Finn as “The Great American
Novel” is a largely accurate description. With this work Twain not only creates
a voice that is purely “American” but also a vocabulary that is capable of
defining that voice.
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CHAPTER 3
TAKING LIES AND MAKING THEM TRUE: THE COLLISION
AND INTERSECTION OF FACT AND FICTION IN TIM
O’BRIEN’S THE THINGS THEY CARRIED

The production of an autobiographical text is fundamentally dependant
on the author’s inner thoughts, memories of past events, and the emotional
content of those memories. Reliance on the author’s memory, because of its
inherent fallibility, makes the autobiography a problematic endeavor in and of
itself. The act of translating memory into written text requires a reexamination
of past personal experiences, and thus the text often manifests itself, like
memory, in fragmentation. The inherent quality of autobiography to be
always-already in a state of fragmentation prompts the question, how can
fiction be delineated from non-fiction when the articulation of complete truth,
complete meaning, are impossible?
Paul de Man explores the problematic nature of autobiography in his
essay “Autobiography as De-facement” asserting that:
Autobiography seems to depend on actual and potentially
verifiable events in a less ambivalent way than fiction does. It
seems to belong to a simpler mode of referentiality, of
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representation, and of diegesis. It may contain lots of phantasms
and dreams, but these deviations from reality remain rooted in a
subject whose identity is defined by the uncontested readability of
his proper name. (920)
Thus, the assumption is that life produces autobiography and the “proper
name” of the author—the designation that he, as author, is not a fictional
manifestation—creates a work that is decidedly divorced from the genre of
fiction. But is this really the case? Is language at all capable of producing
anything other than fiction or, at the full extent of its capacities, a work of neartruth? De Man makes the speculation that “the autobiographical project may
itself produce and determine the life and that whatever the writer does is in fact
governed by the technical demands of self-portraiture and thus determined, in
all its aspects, by the resources of his medium”(920). De Man’s conjecture is
quite to the point—the author’s production of a literary self-portrait is an act of
self-creation (or recreation) wherein the divide between author and narrator is
bridged. Also, the assumption is that the literary subject/figure’s refferant, the
author, fundamentally and accurately determines the character of the
subject/figure. Yet the figure itself is a manifestation of the author, separated
from a purely fictional character only by its originary point of reference. Thus,
the subject of any autobiography emerges in fragmented form, as a manifested
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persona rather than a breathing individual. The subject produced in
autobiography is a fictional construction of the author’s internalized self-image,
and the resulting figure is a manifestation of singular self-definition. In essence,
the author is only capable of creating a persona; the problem being that the
person of the author and the manufactured persona are misunderstood to be
synonmis terms.
De Man proposes that the author’s desire to portray himself or herself in
a certain way allows for the possibility of the subject (the author’s textual selfexposition) defining the referent (author), but I see this as an unavoidable
characteristic of the text itself. The autobiography claims something far greater
than a work of fiction—an accurate depiction of literal historical situations and
subsequently literal truths that proceed from them. Herein lies the fundamental
problem. Not only is this truth filtered and adjusted through the lens of the
helplessly biased author/narrator, but also the intent of the author is to
produce a text that proclaims to simultaneously live life and understand life.
De Man’s theories about the nature of autobiography can be applied to
virtually all texts in the genre (although de Man rejects this conventional label
of classification). But, an autobiographical text that openly acknowledges
these theoretical issues is a rare thing to say the least, and it is quite easy to
understand why the majority of autobiographies never question the validity of
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their accounts. When an author produces an autobiographical text he is
granted complete control over his personal history—an inherent relationship is
formed between the two in which the author “declares himself the subject of his
own understanding” (de Man 921). To negate this declaration is to negate the
assumed credibility of the author. If the author loses credibility then the content
of the text, as a work of nonfiction, does also. And without credibility how can
any text be read as anything other than fiction? Thus, by acknowledging the
inherent fiction that language produces, a challenge comes not only to the
validity of the text, but also to the validity of the individualized psychic self, the
referent of the transcribed subject, the proper name: the author. Furthermore,
a subsequent realization surfaces that the autobiography does not reveal
reliable self-knowledge as it is generally intended to do, but rather it reveals
the impossibility of closure (de Man 922). Simply put, the power that
autobiography instills in the author, however illusory it may be, is much more
appealing than the abysmal possibility that the autobiographical work, even
when completed, will always be fragmented, fictive, and ultimately incomplete.
While few autobiographical texts deal with the impossibility of closure
brought on by the conflict of differentiation between fiction and nonfiction, Tim
O’Brien’s The Things They Carried confronts it directly. The autobiographical
novel recounts O’Brien’s experiences as an American soldier in the Vietnam
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War. O’Brien is virtually obsessed with articulating the “truth” of his
experiences, but, as Tina Chen observes, the “truth” of these experiences does
not lie in realistic depictions or definitive accounts. Rather, his stories are
designed to provoke a precise emotional response (Chen 77). Elaborating on
this point, Chen writes:
The [text’s] emphasis on the body’s visceral response to fiction
aptly encapsulates O’Brien’s investigation of the literal and
metaphoric relationships between stories and bodies, particularly
as such affiliations are forged by a psychology of exile and
displacement. (Chen 77)
This metaphoric relationship between stories and bodies that Chen discusses
can also be explained as a relationship between physical or historical
happenings and the internalized comprehension of those happenings. The
relationship occurs when the gap between literal history and internalized
interpretation is bridged with the lingual articulation of the latter, manifesting
itself as a communicative act of interpretation: the story. The problem, of
course, is language. O’Brien openly recognizes how language tends to
obscure truth rather than reveal it. Unlike many other autobiographers who
combat this problem by decisively intermingling external historical information
with personal accounts, O’Brien moves away from the rigidly historical, opting
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instead to embrace the metaphorical by exploring internalized interpretations
of historical events. In this way, the text openly questions conventional ideas
about language’s ability to articulate truth and meaning. O’Brien himself
writes, “absolute occurrence is irrelevant” because “a true war story does not
depend on that kind of truth” (89). Thus, the text and the author seek to
redefine conventional notions of truth and subsequently question what makes a
text autobiographical. As a result, O’Brien openly acknowledges that his
autobiography has fictional aspects, but the “fictional” facets of the novel are
rarely delineated clearly from the “non-fictional” aspects and as a result the
differentiation between the two often remains ambiguous. But according to
O’Brien, this is the point.
Perhaps the most glaring example of this blurry dichotomy appears
midway through the book in seventh chapter “How to Tell a True War Story.”
The first declaration in the chapter, “This [story] is true” (67) draws all of the
previous accounts into question. Has the entire book, up to this point, been a
work of fiction? However, there is an insistence in the initial declaration that
this story is, in fact, a work of non-fiction; it is the truth. The story begins with
the death of Curt Lemon, a man in O’Brien’s platoon. After his death, Rat
Kiley, another soldier, writes a letter to Lemon’s sister telling her what a brave
and courageous soldier Lemon was and what a good friend he had been to
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Kiley. Kiley never receives any response to the heartfelt message from
Lemon’s sister. O’Brien, acting as narrator, relays how Lemon and Kiley were
playing a game that involved tossing a smoke grenade back and forth, and
Lemon stepped into a sunlit area during the game and landed on a boobytrapped mortar round—which killed him instantly (67-70). After this account,
O’Brien presents another story that he gained from a different member of the
platoon, Mitchell Sanders. Sanders tells of a particular night when his platoon
hears music echoing through the hills, and the fear and madness that it imparts
on the soldiers. As a result, the hills are firebombed unmercifully. When the
soldiers are later questioned about the reasons for their actions, they are
unable to explain their reasons for the attack. After Sanders concludes his
story, he admits to O’Brien that parts of his story were fabricated, explaining
that the moral truth of the story can only be found in silence—it cannot be
transmitted in words (70-85). Just as Sanders is ultimately unable to resolve the
inconsistencies in his story, O’Brien has trouble separating fact from fiction in
his own account. He writes:
In any war story, but especially a true one, it’s difficult to
separate what happened from what seemed to happen. What
seems to happen becomes its own happening and has to be told
that way. The angles of vision are skewed... The pictures get
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jumbled; you tend to miss a lot. And then afterward, when you go
to tell about it, this is always that surreal seemingness, which
makes the story seem untrue, but which in fact represents the hard
and exact truth as it seemed. (71)
For O’Brien, the literal truth of the situation must be found outside of the written
word or the literally recounted experience. He finds that the incorporation of
fiction into his war account provides the reader with a visceral response that
would be lost without the fictional embellishment of certain events. Thus,
O’Brien’s story in this chapter is elaborated inorder to communicate greater
meaning. He pays special attention to detail—describing the bright warmth of
the midday sun and light playfulness of both Lemon and Kiley. As a result, the
mortar blast not only cliams Lemon’s life, but it creates a stark contrast between
natural beauty and human destruction. Likewise, the “music” in Sanders’s story
may have been nothing more than the manifested fear and anxiety of the
platoon; but the point of the story is not the “music,” but the idea that war is
insanity.
In the same chapter, “How to Tell a True War Story,” O’Brien writes
that “absolute occurrence is irrelevant…a thing may happen and be a total lie;
another thing may not happen and be truer than truth” (83). Yet again he is
explaining the intent of his writing, his war stories, is not to recreate events
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literally, but rather to create a visceral experience in his readers that mirrors
his own emotional store. He gives an this example of a war story that is
fictional, but at the same time it is “truer than truth”:
Four guys go down a trail, A grenade sails out. One guy jumps
on it and takes the blast, but it’s a killer grenade and everybody
dies anyway. Before they die, though, one of the dead guys
says, ‘The fuck you do that for?’ and the jumper says, ‘Story of
my life, man,’ and the other guy starts to smile but he’s dead.
That’s a true story that never happened.(84-5)
With this admittedly fictional scenario O’Brien is able to distill both his writing
style and writing philosophy. His experiences, like the accounts contained in
the novel, are fragmented and disconnected. Only through fiction he is able to
defragment his experiences and communicate a web of meaning—what he
believes to be a more fundamental and complete truth. He discusses this in the
short chapter “Good Form” saying, “I want you [the reader] to feel what I felt.
I want you to know why story-truth is sometimes truer than happening-truth”
(179). For O’Brien, like de Man, autobiography does not reveal reliable selfknowledge. The truth that O’Brien seeks to convey is the impossibility of
closure, which in turn illustrates de Man’s idea that autobiography reveals the
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impossibility of “totalization (that is the impossibility of coming into being) of all
textual systems made up of tropological substitutions” (922).
The most relevant of these de Manian tropological substitutions, as
previously touched on, is the substitution of the author for the manifested
character of the subject, where the two determine each other by mutually
reflexive substitution. The Things They Carried finds a unique application of this
theory because another dimension of substitution is added. O’Brien writes
about himself as author and as historical subject. Thus, O’Brien manifests an
authorial character to accompany his own historically manifested self-subject.
The product of this additional layer of substitution is a metafictional
manifestation that is separate from both the subject and the physical referent.
As a result, O’Brien creates a work of fiction, metafiction, and autobiography.
Only through this third separation of narrative voice is O’Brien able to
acknowledge and, in many ways, override many of the problems that de Man
touches on. Throughout the novel O’Brien implicitly contends that he is not the
subject of his own understanding and finds that his war experiences elude even
his comprehension. In essence, he only has impressions of experience—the
visceral and emotional aftermath of unexplainable happenings.
The autobiographical text that emerges from O’Brien’s presentation of
self in triptych and his insistence on the dichotomy between “happening-truth”

31

and “story-truth” is a work of personal fiction brought on by the act of writing—
the actuality of physicially bringing the text into being. His use of “story-truth”
or admittedly fictionalized situations is produced by the condition of having to
translate experience into words and text. As a result, the act of writing, by
way of reexamination and fictionalization, creates new memories that are
distinguishable from their original catalysts in name only. Which is to say that
O’Brien is able to distinguish the “fictional” accounts from the “non-fictional”
accounts, but both forms contain the same emotional content and stir the same
emotional response. Whether an account is “fictional” or “non-fictional” has
little bearing on whether or not an account is “true.” By telling and retelling
his stories, O’Brien is able to add new meaning to them by adding to his own
personal fiction. And for O’Brien, truth often resides in fiction and repetition of
the story only serves to further the fiction, and perhaps the truth. O’Brien
writes how a true war story “never seems to end,” because inevitably there is
always more to say (83).
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CHAPTER 4
FORGETTING TO REMEMBER: THE CREATION OF PERSONAL
FICTION AND FALSE MEMORIES IN JUNICHIRO TANIZAKI’S
THE KEY

The invention of a personal fiction through the act of writing is often
limited theorehtically to works of non-fiction, but the idea can be applied to
virtually any narrative text. It is intrinsic to the interrelationship between
memory and language. Yet, the problem lies less with memory, and almost
exclusively with language, or rather language’s inability to articulate memory.
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus explores the limits of
language and its correlation with the limits of reality, famously concluding with
the proposition, “What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence”
(89). This work of post-Nietzschean philosophy seeks to explain how reality is
a product of language—how truth, morality, desire, and every other facet of
perception are fundamentally designated and dictated by language. Thus,
following with Wittgenstein’s closing statement, language is an imperfect
vehicle for conveying ultimate meaning. As a result, language instills an innate
drive toward articulation, which is an ultimately futile pursuit because aspects
of experience and understanding are always already lost in translation. The
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attempt to translate the essence of experience into words, spoken or written, is
primarily an attempt to capture or rather relive an experience with all of its
initial vitality. These attempts at articulation result in the creation of a personal
fiction constructed from a fragmented memory born out of the fragmentary
nature of language.
This drive toward articulation and the resulting creation of a personal
fiction are explored to a great degree in Tanizaki’s The Key. The novel is
presented in an epistolary format via the separate but chornologially parallel
journals of a Professor and his wife Ikuko. The construction of the novel as a
dual narrative creates a deminsion of realism and objectivism that is a singular
narrative voice is largely incapable of achieveing. Through these two accounts
the reader assumes the role of voyeur and is given an unfettered view into the
thoughts and minds of both characters. The reader is able to forgo the filter
that an unseen narrator creates, and the result is a narrative account that is not
aware of the reader and therefore not self-conscious. In the case of The Key,
the two journal accounts expose the creation of a personal fiction in an attempt
to ascribe meaning and justification to each narrator’s thoughts, actions, and
desires.
Starting with the Professor, his journal serves as a medium through
which he can voice his wants and desires free from public or private
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speculation and ridicule. The main content of these inner desires is sexual, and
evidence of this can be found as early as the second sentence of his first entry:
“I have always avoided commenting on my sexual relations with Ikuko, for fear
that she might surreptitiously read my diary and be offended”(3). This
sentence can be read as an introduction to both accounts, for they are both a
catalog of sexual desires and experiences that violate social taboos. Yet, in the
case of the Professor, the first instance of the journal as an extension of
memory comes in the January 29th entry. In this particular entry, Ikuko is
incapacitated due to her excess drinking a few nights before. The Professor
takes advantage of her unconsciousness and uses it to view her in the nude.
He goes to great lengths to observe every aspect of his wife’s naked body—
removing all of the bed linens from her body and making use of bright
fluorescent lamps. He comments, “I suppose the average husband is familiar
with all the details of his wife’s body, down to the very wrinkles on the soles of
her feet. But Ikuko has never let me examine her in that way”(28). The
Professor is driven to the point of titillation by the forbidden nature of this
inspection and the subsequent account in the journal allows the event to exist in
a static sphere—retaining all of its original vivacity. The Professor goes on to
say, “Now I can love her with twice the passion I used to have,” and “I
steeped myself in the pleasure of looking at her” (30). Thus, the journal not
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only serves to recount the experience but also to strengthen the emotional
content of the memory through the composition of the text.
The creation of the Professor’s personal fiction begins immediately with
the act of writing. Through language he is able to identify his desires and
subsequently provide his desires with a false essence. The act of seeing his
wife naked and closely inspecting her body creates false memories of intimacy,
and these false memories conjure a false emotional response. Freud explains
the delusional satisfaction of desire in The Interpretation of Dreams, stating that
the individual invents a first experience of satisfaction, and this is a nostalgic
first experience that never existed in actuality. Thus, this fiction, this myth,
constructs itself as a past that never was a present (87-96). The excitement that
the Professor feels is a product of his self-manufactured myth of satisfaction. In
actuality he and Ikuko have never shared moments of deep intimacy, but
through his journal he is able to create a fiction that satisfies this desire.
By conjuring memories of satisfaction The Professor is able to give
proper names to his desires, and in this way language places him as the
subject and Ikuko as the object in a power relationship. Jacques Derrida
explores the act and implications of naming in his work On Grammatology
stating, “To name, to give names that it will on occasion be forbidden to
pronounce, such is the originary violence of language which consists in
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inscribing within a difference, in classifying, in suspending the vocative
absolute” (112). Thus, the system of naming that language provides is
indicative of the power relationship that it creates. Naming gives meaning,
which in turn furthers knowledge, and knowledge provides the capacity for
power and the opportunity for control. Yet the desire for control is not always
malicious; neither is it always conscious; rather it is inherent to the formation
and structure of language. The formation of language is rooted in desire:
Jacques Lacan theorized that the fundamental desire for reunification of child
with mother spawns all other desires, and the means to acquire these objects of
desire is language (Lacan 1-7). Hence, advances toward objects of desire are
all designed to either place one or keep one in the role of the subject. By
creating a fiction—a new language—the Professor is able to gain symbolic
power over Ikuko.
The establishment of a subject/object relationship between the Professor
and Ikuko is also furthered by the Professor’s obsession with visual images of
his wife’s body. In the February 24th entry he begins photographing while she
is unconscious and in the nude, in addition to writing about his experiences.
During this episode an interesting problem arises—all of the pictures are slightly
out of focus. He writes, “Unfortunately, this camera has a rather slow lens, and
no range finder; since I’m not very good at estimating distances, my pictures
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are often out of focus” (53). This can be read as evidence of the futile nature
of the Professor’s documentation. His journal does not suffice as a living
substitute for experience, and as a result of this he turns to photography for
compensation. However, he finds that photographs are also incapable of
capturing the essence of his experiences—symbolized by the poor quality of the
pictures.
The camera then is functioning as Lacan’s mirror—where the infant is
allowed to see itself for the first time as the other (Lacan 1-7). Just as the
mirror image of the child is at once the child and something separate from the
child, the photographs of Ikuko are both her and something separate from her.
The act of photographing Ikuko, like Lacan’s mirror, creates an additional self—
a double that can be inspected to a greater degree than the original.
However, the photographs produce the opposite of the desired effect; they
only serve to alienate the Professor. The blurry images only serve to remind
him that his manufactured myth of satisfaction is, in actuality, a delusion. For
this reason, the images are fragmented and incomplete. Lacan explains that
an encounter of this nature is both an encounter with the self and with history,
and it moves the activity of viewing from a transparent relationship of meaning
and expression to a level in which meaning seems to exist without the presence
of subjectivity (Lacan 45-56). The aim of the photograph, in relation to the
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Professor, is to be both the object and the representation of the object. The
realization of this impossibility results in a challenge to the Professor’s status as
the subject in the power relationship that his personal fiction provides for him.
As the novel progresses, the Professor becomes consumed by the idea of
sustaining memories, or rather sustaining his personal fiction. This becomes
evident when his actual memory becomes increasingly fallible. The March 10th
entry exposes this fear when he relates the trouble he is having remembering
names and locations. With respect to this problem he states, “A terrible
anxiety gripped me” (70), and as a result his obsession with memory is
furthered. In the same entry he writes that, “I have at last found something to
live for” (72). The definition of the word “something” in the previous passage
is not simply the content of his sexual desires but also the ability to document
them in an attempt to relive them via photographs and journal entries. At this
point in the novel, the journal overrides the Professor’s ability to recall
experiences and thus becomes an invaluable aid to his own failing memory.
Also, this scene signals the point where his self-manufactured personal fiction
overrides his perception of reality.
With respect to the Professor’s wife, Ikuko, the journal serves a similar
purpose—a medium to display forbidden thoughts and taboo desires, but her
journal serves a slightly different purpose, or rather, it is taken in a slightly
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different direction. Initially the Professor’s journal serves as a catalyst for her
own journal, and to some extent her writing continues to be responsive in
nature throughout the novel. Yet, she has no desire to gain more knowledge
about her husband by reading his journal, and evidence of this is contained in
her first entry: “Whatever he thinks, I shall never read it. I haven’t the faintest
desire to penetrate his psychology” (10). This statement is notable because
her journal, in many ways, is an attempt to penetrate her psychology. This
desired penetration, like the Professor, results in the creation of a personal
fiction that can be molded and rearranged to accommodate the nature of the
desire and also to justify the means of acquisition.
With respect to memory, Ikuko’s journal functions in the same way as
the Professor’s journal. Yet the subject of her memory is not the Professor but
Kimura, a family friend and her lover. She pours over the sight of his nude
body in the same way that the Professor responds to the sight of her nude
form. Yet she combines both men saying, “He (the Professor) is identified with
you (Kimura), you are part of him, the two of you really are one”(93). This
idea displays both her need for justification of her actions and also the lack of
definition in her own memory, which results in a Lacanian misrecognized
melding of images. At another point in Ikuko’s narrative, the mental rift
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between the Professor and Kimura grows deeper, and as result she retracts her
previous statement:
Now that his (Kimura’s) image has unmistakably come alive, I can
separate him completely from my husband. Once and for all, I
hereby strike out the words “you are part of him, the two of you
are really one.” (104)
With this statement Ikuko solidifies her feelings toward both her husband and
Kimura, and this realization serves to clarify her memories of both men. Thus,
the journal documents her clouded psyche and her subsequent reinterpretation
of the text creates new meaning for previous memories. In this way, the text
forces her to reassess previous thoughts and actions from an entirely new
vantage point and, in essence, create new memories without new experience.
Ikuko’s memory synthesis is one of the main points of separation
between her narrative and that of her husband. The Professor is never able to
achieve a synthesis through his writing and accordingly add new meaning to
his experiences. By the end of the novel, the Professor is using his journal as a
substitute for memory in order to recreate experience. Conversely for Ikuko,
the act of writing coupled with the act of remembering creates experience. As
a result, Ikuko’s understanding of herself is furthered, where the Professor’s
remains stagnant.
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The two parallel narratives in The Key expose how the act of
remembering, or rather the articulation of memory through language, can
foster a specifice type of delusional neurosis. For the Professor, his journal
both exposes his sexual desires and serves to further them to the point of
obsessive fetishism. The memories of his wife are incomplete, and through the
journal he seeks to piece together the fractured mental image of his wife.
Ultimately this proves to be an unsuccessful venture because he finds that his
experiences and his writing create an image similar to his photographs—blurry
and amorphose. Ikuko’s journal exposes her sexual desires, but also allows
her to reassess the meaning of those desires. The mental dichotomy between
her husband and Kimura, which progresses from indistinguishable to clearly
defined, presents her with a mental paradox about the meaning of love and
desire. This is resolved by the emergence of antisocial behavior marked by the
desire for her husband’s death. Ikuko is only able to comprehend the content
of her memories by killing her husband and replacing him with Kimura. This
obsession with remembering pushes both the Professor and Ikuko into the realm
of psychosis—which could have been avoided if either character had allowed
themself to forget. Had Ikuko been able to forget the Professor, perhaps she
would have not killed him. And had the Professor allowed himself to forget the

42

shortcomings of his relationship with Ikuko, his desires would not have reached
the point of fetishism—resulting in the molestation of his wife.
Thus, the struggle to articulate experience and assign meaning to
memory is Tanizaki’s fundamental conflict. The character of the Professor is
ultimately absorbed by his own fiction to the point that reality and fiction
become indistinguishable. Yet, the manufactured fiction, like the photograph,
holds no natural essence and resists meaning. Ikuko is able to reconcile her
manufactured myth eliminating the only obstacle between reality and fiction:
her husband. Both see language as the key to gaining true meaning, but
language is ultimately incapable of this task. Thus, referencing back to
Wittgenstein, those things that the Professor and Ikuko cannot speak or write
about must inevitably remain is silence.
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CHAPTER 5
LANGUAGE, LIES, AND AUDIOTAPE: DECONSTRUCTING
MARGUERITE DURAS’S QUINTESSENTIAL ANTI-NOVEL,
L’AMANTE ANGLAISE

Since its inception, the anti-novel has been a source of intrigue in various
critical circles. Jean-Paul Sartre first coined the term in 1947 in response to
Nathalie Sarraute’s novel Portrait d'un Inconnu (Portrait of a Man Unknown)
and it has since become associated with the Nouvea Roman literary movement
of the 1950s. Characteristically anti-novels challenge conventional ideas about
the structure of the novel—often relying on distortion and fragmentation of the
narrative structure. The concept of the anti-novel, along with the subsequent
creation of the anti-hero, still retains the popular label of “experimental” in
fiction of the late 20th and early 21st century. Authors such as Irvine Welsh
(Trainspotting and The Acid House) and Chuck Palahnuik (Fight Club and
Choke) wholly embrace the anti-novel and extend it to the point of literary
nihilism. Although these writers address topics of hard drug use, ultra-violence,
anarchy, and sexual deviance, the basis for all of these indictments of authority
and conventional morality can be read as a direct challenge to the nature of
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the text itself. Palahnuik’s novel Choke begins with the narrator issuing an
explicit warning to the reader:
If you’re going to read this, don’t bother.
After a couple of pages, you won’t be here. So forget it. Go
away. Get out while you’re still in one piece.
Save yourself. (Palahnuik 1)
This sentiment is also echoed in the opening monologue of the film adaptation
of Welsh’s novel Trainspotting:
Choose your future. Choose life... But why would I want to do a
thing like that? I chose not to choose life. I chose somethin' else.
And the reasons? There are no reasons. Who needs reasons
when you've got heroin? (Trainspotting)
Both passages serve to outline the nihilistic nature of the story that follows
them, but the underlying message is ultimately one of textual meaninglessness.
The words “Save yourself” and “There are no reasons” are not simply
statements about counter culture or illegal drug use—they are actually
indictments of the medium through which meaning and truth are conveyed:
language. Despite the cultural and social climates that influenced the works of
Palahnuik and Welsh, their fiction is firmly rooted in the base concept of the
anti-novel. The works of these two writers are the evolutionary product of this
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literary form, and their work owes a great deal to a handful of mid-century
French writers who are undoubtedly responsible for its inception. Arguably,
one of the earliest and most influential proponents of the anti-novel is French
writer Marguerite Duras. Although she is considered a minor literary figure in
some critical circles, I will argue that her experimentation with literary form
produced one of the purest examples of the anti-novel; one that remains
“experimental” even by the standards of present day fiction.
The forty-nine year span (1943-1992) of Marguerite Duras’s literary
career yielded over forty novels and nearly a dozen plays. With regard to the
anti-novel, perhaps her most remarkable work was published in the middle of
her career (1967). L’Amante Anglaise, upon initial inspection, is a detective
novel. The story takes place in the small rural town of Viorne, France. Claire
Lannes, a cleaning lady at a local elementary school, has just confessed to the
murder and mutilation of her deaf-mute cousin Marie-Thérèse Bousquet—having
cut the body into pieces and disposed of them on train cars headed out of
town. Police have recovered all of the body parts with the exception of the
head. The entire novel is presented in a question and answer form of police
interrogation after both the murder and Claire’s subsequent confession have
taken place. The story is composed of three sections, or rather three
transcribed interviews with individual characters: Robert Lamy, the proprietor
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of a local bistro; Pierre Lannes, Claire’s husband; and finally Claire Lannes, the
confessed murderer. The anonymous interrogator instructs each of the
individuals that he is recording and compiling these interviews for a book that
is to be written about the crime. Yet, because Claire has already confessed to
the murder, the aim of the interrogator is not to uncover guilt, but rather to
uncover Claire’s motives.
At the center of L’Amante Anglaise is the desire for knowledge—the
desire for truth. Yet the novel exposes how language, the fundamental medium
through which truth is rendered, not only obscures the truth, but resists
coherence altogether. The first two interrogations with Robert Lamy and Pierre
Lannes initially serve to cement the known factual information about the events
leading up to the murder and the subsequent confession. Pure speculation by
both parties is the only insight that the interrogator is able to gain about
Claire’s motive for the murder. I am inclined to agree with Erica Eisinger’s
observation that although different witnesses’ versions conflict, it is not because
they are lying or forgetful but because their individual stories, like the separate
parts of the body, cannot reveal the total mystery. Eisinger goes on to say that
the investigation cannot be a formulated recreation of the past but it must be
an invention, a creation itself (Eisinger 517). In this way, the truth about
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Claire’s motives for murdering Marie-Thérèse cannot be discovered, and as a
consequence the truth must be constructed.
Truth as a construct is not only a central problem in this novel but also a
defining element of the anti-novel genre. What sets L’Amante Anglaise apart
from Duras’s other works, and from other works in the genre, is the remarkable
precision with which this problematic structure is exposed. The third and final
section of the novel, Claire’s interrogation, both exposes the construction of
truth and seeks to deconstruct it to the point of meaninglessness. The content of
the third interrogation shifts the novel from a detective story to a stark
character study of a mad woman. The desire of the interrogator is to
understand Claire’s madness and in doing so, comprehend her reasons for
committing murder. This desire to identify, to name, is the desire to impose a
hierarchical subject/object relationship—it is the desire on the part of the
interrogator to establish a joint identity as a means of control. Claire’s inability
to articulate her motives, by way of cryptic and at times incomprehensible
language, prevents the establishment of a power relationship and as a result
the reasons for her actions resist lingual articulation.
Jacques Derrida explores the act and implications of naming in his work
On Grammatology stating, “To name, to give names that it will on occasion be
forbidden to pronounce, such is the originary violence of language which
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consists in inscribing within a difference, in classifying, in suspending the
vocative absolute” (112). Thus, the system of naming that language provides
is indicative of the power relationship that it creates. Naming gives meaning,
which in turn furthers knowledge, and knowledge provides the capacity for
power and the opportunity for control. Yet, the desire for control is not always
malicious, neither is it always conscious, rather it is inherent to the formation
and structure of language. The formation of language is rooted in desire—
Jacques Lacan theorized that the fundamental desire for reunification with the
mother spawns all other desires, and the means to acquire these objects of
desire is language (Lacan 1-7). Hence, advances toward objects of desire are
all designed to either place one or keep one in the role of the subject. Thus, if
the interrogator is able to penetrate Claire’s language, he will secure his
identity as the subject in a power relationship. Claire’s resistance to his
questioning, or rather inability to respond, is evidence of her reluctance, on an
unconscious level, to assume the role of the object in that power relationship.
Derrida discusses this resistance to control, explaining that the refusal to
disclose the proper name results in the reassuring seal of self-identity, the secret
(112). Claire’s secret is then an act of self-defense and self-identity
preservation. Derrida furthers this point stating that, “Violence appears only at
the moment when the intimacy of proper names can be opened by forced

49

entry,” and “The mere presence of the spectator, then, is a violation” (113).
The dialogic form of the novel, where the interrogator assumes the role of
Derrida’s spectator, dictates Claire’s defensive response against the inherent
violence caused by the spectator’s desire to discern identity and meaning
through language.
Although much of the conflict in the novel arises from the Derridian
struggle to assign a proper name to Claire’s motive, the desire of the
interrogator to penetrate her language is ultimately a futile endeavor. Claire’s
secret, the location of the missing head, is a masterfully crafted metaphor on
the part of Duras. Without the head, Marie-Thérèse’s body is fragmented and
incomplete, her form and identity are vaguely discernible but not concrete.
The fragmented state of Marie-Thérèse’s body mirrors the fragmented nature of
Claire’s responses to the interrogator’s questions. When asked about the
location of the head, the two share this exchange:
—I can’t make out why they want the head. The rest
is quite sufficient.
—I told you, a confession has to be complete.
—I don’t understand. (87)
The content of this dialogue is revisited many times throughout the
interrogation, and it always arrives at the same end. For the interrogator, to
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uncover the head is to uncover the motive—to distill the act to its essence.
Herein lies the problem. Should the head be discovered, Claire’s motivation for
committing the act would still remain shrouded in mystery. Thus, the
fragmented body and the missing head are symbolic of the fragmented nature
of language, which makes complete meaning, complete comprehension, and
complete truth all impossibilities. The mistake made by the interrogator is the
confusing of the existence of the head and the essence of the crime. This
confusion is the reason that Claire is unable to understand his request for a
“complete confession.” In the way that the head constitutes a complete body,
the motive constitutes a complete and coherent crime. Yet, just as Claire is
unable to understand the desire for the head, she cannot comprehend why the
articulation of her motive will aid in understanding the act. The confusing of
existence and essence is a central point of inspection in Paul de Man’s work
The Rhetoric of Romanticism. De Man uses the example of Hölderlin’s simile
“…wie Blumen enstehn” (the word originates like the flower) stating the simile
“is in fact a paradox, since origination is inconceivable on the ontological
level, the ease with which we nevertheless accept it is indicative of our desire to
forget…but this combination is made possible only by a deliberate forgetting of
the transcendental nature of the source” (5). Thus, Hölderlin’s simile commits a
logical fallacy—with the flower, existence and essence coincide at all times;
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unlike words, which always originate like something else. Flowers originate
like themselves, without the aid of metaphor or simile; and although words
strive to free themselves from metaphor and simile, this is an impossibility
because language can never achieve the absolute identity of natural objects
(de Man 4-7). Therefore, problems with diction arise when the existence of
language is confused with the essence of language—when a word is viewed as
a self-defining entity to which a singular meaning is attached. When a word is
analyzed in this cyclical manner, the deconstructive nature of the text quickly
becomes apparent as the presumed meaning virtually implodes from the evergrowing weight of textual possibility and variation.
Thus, this confusing of existence and essence is the driving force behind
the interrogator’s line of questioning, yet the examination and subsequent
reexaminations of the same information only serve to obscure and deconstruct
the apparent truth of Claire’s motives to a greater degree. Perhaps the word
that best exemplifies de Man’s concept in relation to the text is the word “mad”
or “madness.” Claire is described as mad by both Robert Lamy and Pierre
Lannes during their interviews, yet when the interrogator submits their usage of
the term to closer inspection neither Robert nor Pierre is able to accurately
define the meaning that he intends to convey. After referring to Claire as a
“lunatic” and speculating that she had “gone out of her mind completely,”
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Lamy himself confesses, “if you ask me to say outright once and for all whether
it was madness or not, I can’t tell you” (33). When questioned about Claire’s
day-to-day interactions with Marie-Thérèse prior to the murder, Pierre states,
“She could be very funny. She and Marie-Thérèse used to lark about
sometimes pretending that they were mad” (53). Yet, when Pierre is later
questioned about his initial attraction to Claire, he conveys that there was a
strong physical attraction, which allowed him to overlook “the strangeness of
her character…her madness” (57). But, the most glaring example of this
textual deconstruction is presented in Claire’s interrogation:
—Supposing there was a motive, a reason, but one that’s
unknown.
—Unknown to whom?
—Everyone. You. Me.
—And where is this unknown reason?
—In you?
—Why in me? Why not in her (Marie-Thérèse), or in the
house, or in the knife? Or in death? Yes, in death.
Is madness a reason?
—Perhaps.
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—When they get tired of looking and not finding anything,
they’ll say its madness. I know.
Oh well. If it’s madness I’ve got, if that’s my illness, I’m not
sorry. (105-6)
Claire’s definition of madness at the end of this selected passage is actually the
most concise definition of the three. She implies that when the search for both
the head of Marie-Thérèse and the motive for her murder have been
thoroughly exhausted, the resulting proper name applied to the act and its
motive will be incomprehensibility or madness.
L’Amante Anglaise concludes without resolve. Having exhausted the
efforts of the interrogator with her seemingly irrelevant stream of
consciousness, Claire at the end of the interview begins another daft musing
that has little or nothing to do with the murder. The irony of the novel is not
that the mystery remains unsolved but rather that truth cannot be attained in
terms of itself. Likewise, language cannot be defined in terms of itself; rather
multiple meanings exist within any given text, and L’Amante Anglaise illustrates
the madness that results from the desire to attain complete and fixed meaning
from a text. Marguerite Duras has created a pure and unadulterated example
of the anti-novel that does not concern itself with meaning in terms of morality,
society, or culture. Rather, it challenges much deeper ideas about how truth
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and meaning are conveyed, and how language is an imperfect medium for
conveying either of the two. I still find the book to be highly “experimental”
even when compared with more recent evolutions of the genre. I do feel that
Irvine Welsh’s question to his reader, “And (what are) the reasons?,” exists as
the quintessential question that the anti-novel asks. Welsh also produces the
quintessential answer: “There are no reasons.”
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CHAPTER 6
THE CARNIVAL AND THE CASK: CONNECTIONS BETWEEN
THE LANGUAGE OF BAKHTIN’S CARNIVAL AND THE CLAIM
OF MADNESS IN “THE CASK OF AMONTILLADO”

The essence of fear is that which is unknown. That which cannot be
explained or understood cannot be controlled and henceforth cannot be
prematurely prevented. The end of lingual articulation where explanation and
comprehension are always already in a state of elusivity fundamentally marks
the end of hierarchical control. Edgar Allen Poe’s “The Cask of Amontillado”
weaves a foreboding tale of horror and suspense that relies primarily on this
innate fear of inarticulation, or rather of hierarchical paralysis that results from
lingual inarticulation, for story construction. The tale itself is the confession of a
man who committed a heinous murder nearly fifty years prior. Montresor, the
narrator, lures Fortunato, his victim, into the ancecestral burial vaults of the
Montresor family, under the pretense that he needs Fortunato’s opinion on a
recently purchased cask of Amontillado wine. Once the two have reached a
remote section of the catacombs, Montresor shackles Fortunato to the crypt’s
back wall and seals him in. The most bemusing and unsettling aspect of the
story is the seeming lack of motive for the crime. As a result, many readers
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and critics have come to the conclusion that Montresor is simply insane, and
thus characterize his aggression singulary as an act of madness. However,
Poe constructs a complex literary framework where the relatively
straightforward claim of madness as motive would render many of the intricate
details of the story arbitrary and meaningless. It is my conjecture that the
details of the narrative, primarily the atmosphere of carnival that frames the
story, are fundamentally responsible for the surface appearance of a
motiveless crime and the subsequent popular notion that Montresor is insane.
Also, the milieu of medieval carnival, while not exposing the motive itself, is
primarily responsible for Montresor’s inability to articulate the cause of his
actions.
In order to understand the reasons for the elusivity of the motive, we
must first understand the nature and implications of the atmosphere of carnival.
In his seminal work on the subject, Rabelais and His World, Mikhail Bakhtin
describes the carnivalesque as an atmosphere of inversion where standard
themes of social makeup are extravagantly juxtaposed with the “temporary
suspension of all hierarchic distinctions and barriers among men…and all the
prohibitions of usual life” (7-9). During carnival, a unique conception of
existence causes the individual to feel he is a part of the collective, at which
point he ceases to be himself and is absorbed into the holistic body of carnival
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(Clark and Holquist 302). Thus, the body of carnival does not concern itself
with the act of social redefinition; rather it thrives on the absence of social
classification and behavior. Bakhtin elaborates on this idea stating:
In fact, carnival does not know footlights, in the sense that it does
not acknowledge and distinction between actors and
spectators…Carnival is not a spectacle seen by people; they live
in it, and everyone participates because its very idea embraces
all people. While carnival lasts, there is no other life outside it.
During carnival time life is subject only to its laws, that is, the laws
of its own freedom. (7-8)
Thus, carnival not only inverts social order but also social laws of conduct.
Rules of law, or rather accepted rules or morality, are not redefined—they are
suspended.
The atmosphere of carnival, with its social and moral inversions, is of
vital importance to Poe’s story. The story implies that both Montresor and
Fortunato are men of relatively high social status. Elena Baraban notes that “A
number of onomastic and semantic characteristics of the text indicate that ‘The
Cask of Amontillado’ is a story about the characters’ power relations and their
social status” (51). Clues to their social status include Montresor’s large home
and extensive store of wine, and also Fortunato’s apparent distinction as a
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renowned wine aficionado. Thus, the opening line of Poe’s story, “The
thousand injuries of Fortunato I had borne the best I could, but when he
ventured on insult, I vowed revenge” (13), hints at a socially dictated
declaration of intent to exact cruel retribution. The first paragraph of the story
is evidence enough that the action involves premeditation, and the relevant
question is not an inquiry into the nature of the “insults” that Montresor has
suffered at the hands of Fortunato but rather why he has chosen carnival as the
backdrop for his actions. Why is the arena of carnival more favorable to
Montresor than any other time? There must be some advantage to his selection
of this specific date when all other details of the Fortunato’s execution have
been so diligently devised. The answer again, lies with Bakhtin.
The carnival reveals an underlying concept of human society—Martin
Heidegger’s conjecture about the true nature of humanity where “Everyone is
the other, and no one is himself” (165) is not only fully actualized during
carnival, but also fully realized. Carnival negates the self-subject “I” and the
disassociated-collective “They;” inside the sphere of carnival only the inclusivecollective “We” exists. Thus, by actualizing his revenge inside the sphere of
carnival, Montresor is able to free himself from a moral dilemma that would be
exacted on the “I” in a normal social sphere. Also, the social and moral
juxtapositions of the carnivalesque are quite evident in the text. Montresor
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recalls, “It was about dusk, one evening during the supreme madness of the
carnival season, that I encountered my friend” (13). His use of the word
“friend” in this context is enigmatic considering that story is presumably a freewilled confession told in the past tense. Why does he use the identifier “friend”
as opposed to “enemy” when he has already divulged his murderous
intentions to his unnamed listener? According to Bakhtin, within the sphere of
carnival these distinctions lose their definition—just as diametric oppositions such
as “good” and “evil,” and “moral” and “immoral” dissolve. The grotesque
body of carnival, as previously stated, is a collective: the individual is lost and
a collective humanity comes into being and as a result internalized conceptions
of morality deplete as the mentality of the individualized self fades away.
Thus, the “supreme madness” of carnival that Montresor describes is also his
madness, for he is a part of that collective carnival body.
To further the idea of negated personal identity, the act of wearing
costumes and masks is very important to the carnivalesque and to “The Cask of
Amontillado.” Of Fortunato, Montresor says, “He had on a tight-fitting partistriped dress and his head was surmounted by the conical cap and bells” (14)
which contrasts his own garb of a black roquelaire or cloak and a black silk
mask (14-15). Aside from the obvious foreshadowing of their contrasting
apparel—Fortunato as the harlequin clad fool and Montresor’s darkly ominous
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resemblance to an executioner—their costumes also reinforce the loss of self
that carnival fosters. The mask is of particular importance to both Poe and
Bakhtin:
Even more important is the theme of the mask, the most complex
theme of folk culture. The mask is connected with the joy of
change and reincarnation, with gay relativity and with the merry
negation of uniformity and similarity; it rejects conformity to
oneself. The mask is related to transition, metamorphoses, the
violation of natural boundaries…(Bakhtin 40)
Through the guise of the executioner’s black mask, Montresor undergoes a
metamorphosis and is able to violate his natural boundaries of morality. Only
through the mask of carnival is he able to carry out the murder of Fortunato
and separate himself from the grim nature of his actions. Also, Poe states
explicitly that Montresor places the mask on his face, but never makes any
reference, explicit or implicit, to it being removed. As a result, an implicit
metaphorical assumption can be made—Montresor wears the concealing mask
of carnival throughout the remainder of the story.
The act of laughter and its functions, in relation to Bakhtin’s theories of
the carnivalesque and “The Cask of Amontillado,” is a vital point of inspection.
Laughter is an indispensable facet of the medieval carnival because it too
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fosters an inversion of binary opposition. Carnivalesque laughter is an
expression of freedom because it was all but eliminated from official spheres
society including the religious, the governmental, the ceremonial, and the
formal etiquette of social hierarchy. This language of laughter “builds its own
world, its own church, its own state versus the official state” (Bakhtin 73,88).
Thus, the laughter of carnival characterizes the language of carnival as one of
joyous and celebratory opposition—making light of societal norms by making a
satire of formal language. Laughter functions to complete the illusion that
carnival casts over the individual, and this is apparent in the case of “The Cask
of Amontillado.” As Montresor and Fortunato trek from the street to the depths
of Montresor’s familial catacombs, the two are constantly engaged in lively
banter—Fortunato’s tone is intoxicated and often on the fringes of lewdness,
while Montresor’s demeanor is accommodating and barbituratly collected as
he offers up left-handed responses to Fortunato’s musings. This informal banter
is important because it identifies both (to the reader and each character to the
other) as creatures of the carnival—their social rank is suspended, as is their
implicit social history. This carnivalesque banter even persists after Fortunato
has been chained to the wall of the crypt and only comes to an end just before
Montresor positions the final brick into place. Through this language of
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laughter and farce, Montresor is able stabilize the illusion of carnival and carry
out the murder.
All of the aspects of carnival—collective atmosphere, binary inversions,
masks and costumes, and laughter—have created a space where Montresor
can actualize his murder-fantasy. Yet, it is imperative that all of these aspects
of carnival remain intact or the illusion of the inclusive-collective “We” dissolves
and the self-subject “I” reemerges with its individualized guilt and singular
accountability. The threat of unveiling the self-subject is evident in at least two
instances during the story and evidence of this can be seen in swift changes in
Montresor’s otherwise consistently calm demeanor. The first comes halfway
through the process of sealing the crypt:
A succession of loud and shrill screams, bursting suddenly from
the throat of the chained form, seemed to thrust me violently
back. For a brief moment I hesitated—I trembled. Unsheathing
my rapier, I began to grope with it about the recess; but the
thought of an instant reassured me. (17)
Fortunato’s screams of desperation are the first break from the carnivalesque
language in the dialogue between the two, and this alone threatens to take
Montresor out of the sphere of carnival. He renders the situation by screaming
louder than Fortunato, which is a rather obvious and unintelligible fear
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response. The relevant question is not why he responded in this irrational and
enigmatic manner, but rather, what is the source of the fear that produced his
response? He stated earlier that he had sent all of his servants away for the
evening and, therefore, his house is empty, not to mention that he is deep in
the recesses of an underground vault. His fear is not of discovery but one of
identification outside of the sphere of carnival. However, Fortunato’s laughter
returns before the illusion completely dissolves. The second time that
Montresor’s carnivalesque perception is threatened is just before the last stone
is set into place. Fortunato pleads to Montresor to let him out because of the
late hour—as if the entire ordeal has been an elaborate practical joke.
Montresor issues calm replies that mockingly suit Fortunato’s requests. Finally
the conversation ends with Fortunato being reduced to silence, and to this
Montresor reacts in a way that again contrasts with his demeanor: he becomes
impatient. He begins yelling Fortunato’s name to no avail, and finally
concludes both the conversation and the story by shouting “In pace
requiescat!” (translates as ‘May you rest in peace’). His apparent unease is
the product of the dissolving perception of carnival, which is in turn brought on
by a condition of the completed act: he is left alone. Carnival is not a
condition of the individual; it is dependant on a group’s formation of a
collectively inclusive identity. Together, Montresor and Fortunato were able to
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constitute that collective body of conciousness, but in Fortunato’s absence the
illusion of carnival is broken and Montresor’s outwardly shown agitation and
verbal aggression signal his shift out of collective consciousness.
The story, along with Montresor’s deathbed confession, ends without
any further elaboration on the motive for the crime, other than the vague
reference to “the thousand injuries” that Fortunato had previously inflicted on
Montresor. Yet even if Poe had elaborated on the finer points of Montresor’s
motive, the act would undoubtedly still defy articulate comprehension. The
murder of Fortunato is contained within a sphere of carnival where hierarchies
are inverted and subverted because the language that creates them is
fundamentally deconstructed. Thus, carnival cannot be articulated, it can only
be experienced—in this same way, Montresor can relate how the crime was
carried out, but he is unable to communicate why the murder was committed.
Fortunato’s murder exists as a supreme act of carnival—an inversion of death
and renewal. As a result, the crime does not exist outside the sphere of
carnival, or rather in cannot be understood or articulated outside of that
collective body. Once divorced from the inclusive-collective, Montresor is
incapable of comprehending the act singularly. Therefore, his murder of
Fortunato is not diffitive proof of clinical psychosis, or even an elaborate fit of
temporary insanity. Although the claim of madness cannot be completely
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justified, it is possible to deduce that at the time of the muder, Montresor was
certianly not himself. He was the carnival—completely immersed in its
“supreme madness” where laws do not exist because there is no “other,” no
governing body nor separate defining entity. Within the sphere of carnival,
there is only carnival and carnival alone. With this in mind, then perhaps
madness is the most suitable explanation for Montresor’s actions, but this is not
to say that madness is a characteristic of the carnivalesque. It is not. Rather, the
word “madness,” along with a variety of other synonymous terms,
fundamentally characterizes carnival’s inability to render itself outside of itself.
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